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Abstract Malware is a shorthand of malicious software that are created with the intent of
damaging hardware systems, stealing data, and causing a mess to make money,
protest something, or even make war between governments. Malware is often
spread by downloading some applications for your hardware from some down-
load platforms. It is highly probable to face with a malware while you try to
load some applications for your smart phones nowadays. Therefore it is very
important that some tools are needed to detect malware before loading them
to the hardware systems. There are mainly three different approaches to de-
tect malware: i) static, ii) dynamic, and iii) hybrid. Static approach analyzes
the suspicious program without executing it. Dynamic approach, on the other
hand, executes the program in a controlled environment and obtains informa-
tion from operating system during runtime. Hybrid approach, as its name
implies, is the combination of these two approaches. Although static approach
may seem to have some disadvantages, it is highly preferred because of its lower
cost. In this paper, our aim is to develop a static malware detection system by
using text categorization techniques. To reach our goal, we apply text mining
techniques like feature extraction by using bag-of-words, n-grams, etc. from
manifest content of suspicious programs, then apply text classification meth-
ods to detect malware. Our experimental results revealed that our approach
is capable of detecting malicious applications with an accuracy between 94.0%
and 99.3%.
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1. Introduction
As the use of smart mobile devices increases, the number of applications available for
these devices are gradually increasing as well. However, these applications may be
malicious software (i.e., malware) and cause security vulnerabilities such as stealing
data, causing a mess to make money, protest something, and even make war between
governments [21]. Installing an application on mobile devices was very difficult in
the past, as there was not any central download platform. But nowadays, the mobile
device users can easily download any application from the central platforms such
as App Store, Google Play Store, and Windows Store. Many users and developer
communities have focused on these platforms and this new model that is developed
for distributing and installing applications has been significantly successful [46].
The smart device platforms provide official application markets by adopting some
security approaches which are devoted to block malicious attacks. Despite such pre-
cautions, however, malware may be installed on the smart devices and/or get an entry
to the application markets [46]. Especially, Android platform allows users to install
applications from unauthorized sources (e.g., third party markets) and this enables
malware to be distributed easily [4]. This means that it is highly probable to face with
a malware while you try to load some applications for your mobile device from one
of these platforms. A report1 claimed that approximately half of the Android mal-
ware are multifunctional Trojans which steal personal information. There are also
approximately 750,000 new Android malware that were detected in the first quarter
of 20172. All of these indicators prove that effective malware detection is required for
Android applications.
In order to detect and block Android malwares, various approaches were em-
ployed so far. These approaches can be classified into three categories, namely, static,
dynamic and hybrid [2, 5, 18, 34]. In static analysis, features are extracted by re-
verse engineering from the Android application file (i.e., apk), without executing the
application [4, 5, 22, 58]. Notice that an apk file comprises of application codes and
resources and created with the files including AndroidManifest.xml and classes.dex
in DEX (Dalvik Executable) format. Static analysis aims to analyze malware using
only the information provided by the program itself. This is generally performed by
decompilation process which recovers the static source (API/System calls, permis-
sions, opcodes, and hexadecimal byte sequences etc.,) of program [10, 35, 58]. The
static analysis has a disadvantage that it can not detect malware that dynamically
download malicious code [2] as Android operating system (OS) allows applications
to load additional code (malicious or benign) from external sources at runtime. On
the other hand, dynamic analysis uses the execution traces of the application in
a controlled environment [9] for malware detection. The analysis is performed by
running the application on device and such information as system calls, network
1https://securelist.com/IT-Threat-Evolution-Q2-2017-Statistics/79432/
2G Data Security Blog: 8400 New Android Malware Samples Every Day
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access, and file and memory modifications are obtained from operating system during
runtime [19, 47, 57, 61]. This approach removes the limitations (e.g., unpacking and
obfuscation) of the static analysis [2, 34]. However, dynamic approach generally re-
quires more resources in terms of memory space and running time when compared to
static analysis [47]. The main difference between the static and dynamic approaches
is the necessity of running application on the device [3, 4, 12, 42]. The hybrid anal-
ysis is a combination of static and dynamic methods, and it creates a framework to
perform both of the analyses [2, 7, 31, 49]. In hybrid approach, the static analysis is
performed at first without executing the application. Then, the dynamic analysis is
performed, if necessary, by using the information obtained from static analysis [5]. In
all approaches, malicious applications are generally detected by borrowing classifiers
from the machine learning field [1, 9, 11,46,56].
Although static approach may seem to have some disadvantages, it is highly
preferred because of its lower cost with respect to other methods. In this paper, our
aim is to develop a malware detection system for Android based mobile devices as they
are widely used nowadays. Our system is based on static malware detection approach
by using text mining methods. Currently, some of the existing works that apply the
static approach also use text mining methods by generally considering static data
(e.g., permissions, manifest content, meta-data, and source code) of applications [33,
37, 40, 44, 51, 55]. However, differently from existing works, our framework adopts
text categorization for this purpose and extracts different features directly from the
manifest content of each application to detect malware. Contributions of our study
can be summarized as follows:
• We designed a server-side system to enable users to perform malware analysis.
• Differently from existing works, our system is completely based on the manifest
contents of the suspicious applications and it employs text mining techniques for
the purpose of the malware detection.
• This is the first time that bow, n-gram, and sstf (see Section 3.2) features are
used in manifest based malware detection task.
• We conducted intensive experiments to explore the effect of applying dimension
reduction together with different circumstances where feature set and classifier
are different.
• We obtained better results than other static analysis based studies, from which
some of them are completely focused on the manifest file.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: In the next section, we summarize the
previous studies. In Section 3, we explain methods used in this paper. We present
our experimental results in Section 4. We then discuss the limitations and give future
directions of this study in Section 5 and, finally, we present our conclusions in the
last section.
2. Literature Review
Android is an open source and widely used OS based on the Linux kernel. As pop-
ularity of the Android increases, the number of malwares that target this platform
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rises as well. Therefore, there are many studies that use static, dynamic, or hybrid
approaches to detect malwares and prevent malicious attacks for Android. In this
section, we review the literature for Android malware detection (AMD) field and only
present studies that are similar to our study. We also summarize these previous works
in Table 1.
Table 1
Some of the research works which propose an AMD framework in three different malware
detection approaches
Approach Research Work Features Method Year
Static
SCANDAL [27] Bytecode of application
Dalvik Core
interpretation
2012
DroidMat [56]
Permissions, Intent messages
passing etc., and API calls
Machine learning 2012
MAMA [46] Permissions, uses-feature tags Machine learning 2013
DroidAPIMiner [1] API calls Machine learning 2013
AndroSimilar [20] Variable length signatures Fuzzy hashing 2013
PUMA [45] uses-permission/feature tags Machine learning 2013
DroidAnalytics [60] 3 level signatures Similarity score 2013
DREBIN [4] Manifest, Disassembled code Machine learning 2014
PMDS [42] Permissions Machine learning 2014
ANASTASIA [22] Disassembled code features Machine learning 2016
ADROIT [35]
Permissions and meta-information
from app store
Machine learning 2016
DMDAM [8] Permissions Machine learning 2017
Arslan et al. [6] Permissions Machine learning 2019
Kim et al. [28] Various Features Deep learning 2019
Our study
Manifest based textual features
(bow, n-gram, and sstf)
Machine learning 2019
Dynamic
TaintDroid [19] Data flows Taint tracking 2010
CrowDroid [9] Traces of system calls k-means clustering 2011
AntiMalDroid [59] Signatures based on behaviors Machine learning 2011
Andromaly [48] Device states and events Machine learning 2012
DroidScope [57] Traces of system calls
Virtual machine
introspection
2012
DroidScribe [18] Runtime behaviors Machine learning 2016
DroidCat [10] Application execution traces Machine learning 2016
CSCdroid [58] Determinate system calls Markov chain and SVM 2017
Monet [52] Runtime behavior signature Signature matching 2017
Wang et al. [55] HTTP flows Machine Learning 2018
Hybrid
Andrubis [31]
Manifest meta-data, bytecode,
Dalvik VM actions
Code coverage 2014
Mobile-Sandbox [49]
Permissions, smali codes etc.,
and runtime behaviors
Machine learning 2015
DroidNative [2]
ACFG and SWOD signatures
from MAIL patterns
A decision tree based
similarity detector
2017
Martin et al. [36] Static and dynamic features Machine Learning 2019
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2.1. Static Analysis
Kim et al. proposed a static analyzer, namely, ScanDal that uses Dalvik Core inter-
pretation method and extracts features from bytecode of the application [27]. Wu et
al. proposed DroidMat, a system that extracts the information from each applica-
tion’s manifest file, and regards components as entry points to trace API calls related
to permissions [56]. MAMA extracts permission and uses-feature tags from the appli-
cation’s manifest content and uses machine learning methods to distinguish benign
applications from malwares [46]. Drebin is a machine learning based method that
uses features extracted from manifest and disassembled code of application to perform
static analysis [4]. Rovelli et al. developed a permission based machine learning model
for malware analysis [42]. Aafer et al. proposed DroidAPIMiner, a machine learning
based system that relies on the API, package, and parameter level information [1].
AndroSimilar is an approach that generates signature by extracting statistically im-
probable features to detect malicious Android applications [20]. Sanz et al. present
PUMA for detecting malwares through machine learning techniques by analysing the
extracted permissions from the application [45]. Zheng et al. used opcode level sig-
natures of applications to perform static malware analysis [60]. Fereidooni et al.
presented a statics machine learning based system, namely, ANASTASIA which uses
560 different features extracted from disassembled code of applications [22]. ADROIT
uses text categorization approach to detect malicious applications. This method ex-
tracts features from the meta-data information of application which is available both
in the app store and Android manifest [35]. Bhattacharya and Goswami performed
malware classification based on permission features by using different machine learn-
ing classifiers [8]. Arslan et al. performed permission-based malware detection based
on machine learning [6]. They obtain results to be processed by a comparing the
observed frequencies of the requested permissions both in malicious and benign ap-
plications. Kim et al. proposed a framework that uses similarity-based feature (e.g.,
permission, component, environmental etc.) extraction and employs multimodal deep
learning for malware detection [28].
2.2. Dynamic Analysis
Cox et al. proposed TaintDroid, a dynamic system that tracks the flow of privacy
sensitive data through third-party applications and uses the data flows to detect mal-
wares [19]. CrowDroid is a server-side framework that uses traces of system calls to
perform dynamic analysis of applications [9]. Zhao et al. proposed a software behavior
signature based framework which uses SVM algorithm to detect malicious applica-
tions [59]. Andromaly is a client-side application that employs features obtained from
the device states and events to perform machine learning based dynamic malware de-
tection [48]. DroidScope is an emulation based malware analysis engine that can be
used to analyze the java and native components of Android applications [57]. Dash et
al. present DroidScribe, a system that generates features at different levels including
pure system calls, decoded binder communication, and abstracted behavioral patterns
to perform SVM based Android malware family categorization [18]. DroidCat uses a
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set of behavioral features obtained through systematic dynamic profiling of applica-
tions for dynamic detection of Android malwares [10]. Differently from other works,
CSCdroid uses all system calls to construct feature vectors in order to determine the
security of applications [58]. Sun et al. proposed Monet framework that includes both
client and server modules and uses both runtime behavior and static structures to
detect malware variants [52]. Wang et al. proposed a dynamic method which uses
text semantic features of mobile traffic for malware detection [55]. This method con-
siders every HTTP flow as a document and then uses n-grams to generate candidate
features for machine learning model.
2.3. Hybrid Analysis
There have been only a few studies that perform hybrid analysis of Android applica-
tions. The published works that we aware of and use the hybrid approach as follows:
Andrubis uses features extracted both during the static analysis and dynamic anal-
ysis (e.g., Dalvik VM actions, activities etc.) for the purpose of malware detection.
Mobile-Sandbox is an easily accessible system through a web interface. It combines
both static and dynamic approaches and uses different features (e.g., permissions,
smali codes, and runtime behaviours etc.) to perform mach ne learning based mal-
ware detection [49]. DroidNative is a hybrid system that is able to detect malwares
embedded in bytecode or native code [2]. This system performs static analysis on
native code and hybrid analysis on byte code. It also adapts a technique from win-
dows malware detection, namely, MAIL for Android malware detection. Martin et al.
presented a dataset, namely, OmniDroid that includes 22K real-world malicious and
benign applications. They also performed malware detection on this dataset by using
their approach which is based on the fusion of static and dynamic features [36].
Similar to our paper, text categorization approach is employed in some stud-
ies to detect malicious applications especially in static approach. Wang et al. used
lexical features of HTTP header to discover malicious behaviors [55]. The authors ob-
tained HTTP header by tracing the mobile network traffic and utilize n-gram model
to extract features from this header that is a structured plain text. Suarez-Tangil
et al. proposed Dendroid, a framework that utilizes text mining approach for code
structures based malware detection [51]. The authors present a novel way to measure
similarity to automatically classify malwares into families. Santos et al. used n-gram
based file signatures to detect malicious Android application [44]. Milosevic et al.
used bag of words model to extract features from the source code of applications for
the purpose of malware detection [40]. Malhotra and Bajaj employed text mining
approach to extract instruction sets in their signature based pattern matching tech-
nique [33]. Mas’ud et al. explored the use of different feature selection methods in
the n-grams based malware detection. The authors extracted the n-grams from sys-
tem call sequences of the applications [37]. Wang et al. proposed a method, namely,
TextDroid which combines text mining and machine learning to detect Android mal-
wares [54]. This method is based on mobile network traffic and uses the HTTP flow
header to extract n-gram features that used in malware classification.
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As it can be understood from the literature, our work advocates a different idea
than others (see Table 1) and the majority of text mining based Android malware de-
tection studies mentioned above utilize n-gram features and do not focus on manifest
content. Differently from existing works, in this paper, we utilize text mining approach
to extract different level of semantic features (e.g., bow, n-grams, and stylistic fea-
tures) from manifest content. We utilize these features both separately and together
with each other including permission features to observe the effect on performance.
3. System Design
In this section, we introduce methods utilized in our server-side design which adopts
text categorization approach for AMD by using machine learning methods. As de-
picted in Figure 1, Android users and developers are able to perform analysis by send-
ing application file to the remote server hosting our system that uses the following
methods to perform malware detection: (1) decompilation of application archive files,
(2) textual feature extraction, (3) dimension reduction, and (4) classification. When
an application is sent (e.g., via a client module) to the remote server, it decompiles
APK file to get AndroidManifest.xml file.
Figure 1. Flowchart of our malware detection process
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Then, it extracts features from this manifest content and transforms them into
feature vectors. After the feature extraction, dimension reduction is applied to select
distinctive features and, finally, the system builds a predictive model on preprocessed
data by training a machine learning algorithm. It uses this predictive model to classify
previously unseen applications as malicious or benign.
3.1. Text Categorization
Text categorization methods are used in our proposed malware detection system.
Text categorization is a subfield of text mining and it is used to automatically assign
one of the predefined class labels to a document by using machine learning methods.
Let D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} represent document set and classes
respectively. In text categorization, one category cj is assigned to a document di and
this process is generally performed by using features extracted from a document set.
As the classes are predefined, text categorization is also considered as a supervised
machine learning task [16].
3.2. Preprocessing and feature extraction
Each APK file includes the codes and resources (e.g., image and manifest files) of
relevant application program. The Extensible Markup Language (XML) files included
in these resources are used for installing and/or activating the application. One of the
most important XML files is AndroidManifest.xml file. In order to run a component
by the Android OS, it must be defined in this manifest file. Therefore, the manifest
file must be included in application root, and components (e.g., Activities, Broadcast
Receivers, Services, and Content Providers) must be defined in this file. This file
must also include permission information (e.g., internet access or read access to user’s
contacts) required by the application, since declaring a permission implies intention
to use related API [46].
Our system utilizes text categorization for malware detection and differently from
previous studies, it solely focuses on the manifest content that is considered as a doc-
ument. To do this, the manifest file of each application is obtained by decompressing
and it is converted into a file with txt extension to extract textual features. Then,
the punctuation marks are removed and lowercase conversion is applied over the con-
tents. Next, bag of words (a.k.a bow), n-grams, and stylistic and structural properties
(i.e., sstf) of the content are used as features, and performances of these well-known
feature extraction methods are compared for the malware detection task. In addition,
permission information are directly extracted from each application program file with
the help of ApkReader tool3 and each of the application’s required permission is also
used as a feature. In bow model, documents are tokenized by whitespaces and each
token considered as a feature (i.e., word or term) which is used to represented the doc-
uments by assigning a weight to each term in the documents [24]. Assigning weight
3https://github.com/hylander0/Iteedee.ApkReader
332 punctuation marks which are available in ASCII
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to each term (i.e., feature) in each document is performed by using the observed fre-
quency of the feature in the document. In n-gram model, on the other hands, features
are generally obtained in two different levels: character and word levels. In character
level n-gram, each feature is formed by taking the consecutive n-characters from the
document, in word-level n-gram, each feature contains n adjacent words. However, we
used the character level trigram features, since the character level is more successful
than the word level in general [25]. Notice that we chose trigrams as they often akin
to perform better than the bigrams [13]. The character level n-gram model is inde-
pendent from language used to form the document, and it is strong against some cases
as misspelling and abbreviation [32]. The sstf model is widely used in text mining
based fields (e.g., author identification, text genre detection, music genre classifica-
tion) to extract features (e.g., structural attributes and statistical information) from
structured or semi-structured texts [38,50]. In this paper, we adopted 20 sstf features
(see Table 2) for malware detection. We believe that it is the first time that stylistic
and structural properties of the manifest content are utilized in AMD field. After the
feature extraction, we transformed each manifest file into a numeric feature vector by
applying term weighting methods. In term weighting phase, we employed BINARY
and Augmented Normalized Term Frequency (ANTF) methods [43] to assign weights
for permission-based and textual features respectively.
Table 2
Abbreviated (Abb.) names of the sstf features employed in our system.
Abb. Feature Abb. Feature
WPLA Words Per Line Average NOEX Number of Exclamation Mark
LLA Line Length Average NOE Number of Ellipsis Mark
NOQ Number of Question Mark NOW Number of Words
NODQ Number of Double Quotation Mark PR Punctuation Ratio4
WLA Word Length Average NOH Number of Hyphen Mark
VR Vocabulary Richness CPWA Character Per Word Average
UWPL Unique Word Per Line NOC Number of Comma Mark
CPWV Character Per Word Variance NOL Number of Lines
NODV Number of Decimal Value NOUW Number of Unique Words
WPLV Words Per Line Variance NOCL Number of Colon Mark
The BINARY and ANTF methods are formulated as follows:
WBINARY (p,m) =
{
1, if m contains permission p
0, otherwise
(1)
WANTF (c,m) =
1 + TF (c,m)/maxt∈mTF (t,m)
2
(2)
In Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), TF represents raw term frequency of term (feature) c in a
manifest content m, whereas p corresponds to a permission definition in m. The
maxt∈mTF (t,m) is also the maximum term frequency in related m.
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3.3. Dimension reduction
We employed the Correlation based Feature Selection (CFS) method to select dis-
criminative features and reduce feature space. CFS is a feature selection (FS) filter
that ranks feature subsets in accordance with the relationship based on a heuristic
function. This heuristic function works on the feature subsets which have high ranked
correlation between the classes but does not include any correlation among each oth-
ers [23]. We preferred to use this feature selector as it does not need to know the
number of features to be selected. After selecting the most informative features we
use only these selected features to perform classification task.
3.4. Classification
To perform classification, we borrow Naive Bayes (NB), Multinomial Naive Bayes
(MNB), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Maximum Entropy (ME), and C4.5 clas-
sifiers from the machine learning field to investigate the effect of classifier on the
performance of malware detection. We employ these methods as they are well-known
and still commonly used classifiers in text categorization field [30].
• NB and MNB are practical methods [39] based on Bayes’ probability theory
which is utilized in many fields.
• C4.5 algorithm [41] is used to construct decision trees from the data.
• SVM is a kernel based classifier [14] and also robust to data sparsity.
• ME [15] supposes that features are interdependent unlike classifiers that use the
Bayes theory.
4. Performance Evaluation
4.1. Datasets
In AMD field, there are many studies which are evaluated on different datasets for
different purposes. Some of these datasets consist of only malware samples or various
malware families, whereas some of them contain only benign samples. We also have
a difficulty in this field that new malware samples arise constantly. In this paper,
therefore, we selected the following datasets as evaluation material:
• DREBIN5 dataset contains 5560 applications from 179 different malware fami-
lies [4].
• AndroTracker6 dataset includes 51179 benign and 4554 malware applications
from different malware families [26].
• M0DROID (M0) dataset includes 400 samples in benign and malware categories
that have equal distribution [17].
5http://user.informatik.uni-goettingen.de/~darp/drebin/
6http://ocslab.hksecurity.net/andro-tracker
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The DREBIN dataset does not include any sample in benign category and the An-
droTracker dataset is too large and unbalanced. The M0 dataset is balanced but its
size is quite small when compared with other two datasets. In this study, our aim is
to evaluate our system on balanced and different datasets that include both benign
and malware samples. Therefore, we created two different datasets using the DREBIN
and AndroTracker. In this way, we obtained a subset of AndroTracker (S-AT) by ran-
domly choosing 5311 samples in benign category and whole samples in the malware
category. By taking benign samples from the AndroTracker and malware samples
from the DREBIN, we also created Drebin-AndroTracker (DRBN-AT) dataset which
has 10000 samples equally distributed in two categories. In this process, our aim is
to create small and balanced datasets as the size of the datasets is out of the scope
of this paper. We use the M0 dataset as it is (without any change). Note that we
have removed some application files from which any manifest file or permission infor-
mation could not be extracted in decompilation process. This is because the reverse
engineering tool7 we used fails in some cases where it may require to find and install
mobile OS specific framework files in order to properly decode application program
files8. The number of samples before and after the decompressing in our selected
datasets are given in Table 3.
Table 3
Distribution of the samples among two classes of the selected datasets before and after the
decompilation (decompressing)
Dataset
# of samples
Before Decompilation After Decompilation
Benign Malware Benign Malware
M0 200 200 128 192
S-AT 5311 4554 3933 4421
DRBN-AT 5000 5000 3933 4637
4.2. Configuration
We utilized the CFS, NB, MNB, SVM, and C4.5 methods through WEKA9 open source
machine learning toolkit. At the time of writing, we used WEKA 3.6.1, but any version
close to this will be sufficiently similar. We also employed the ME algorithm by using
MaxEnt package10 within the OpenNLP11 which is a machine learning based toolkit for
the processing of natural language text. For all the methods mentioned above, we used
the default parameter settings, where kernel of the SVM is linear, search method
of the CFS is Best First, and confidenceFactor of the C4.5 is 0.25. We trained
7https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
8https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/documentation/
9http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
10http://maxent.sourceforge.net/about.html
11https://opennlp.apache.org/
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our ME model with the help of generative iterative scaling (GIS) algorithm,
assuming 100 iterations and no cutoff. We validated performance of the classifiers
with 10-fold cross validation [29] and evaluated the system for several parameters like
accuracy (Acc), precision, recall, and F-measure [53].
4.3. Results
We conducted experiments on three different datasets and investigated the classifica-
tion results for different classifier and feature set combinations. We also performed
experiments for the cases that the feature set is obtained by feature selection and
without feature selection. After decompilation of application files, textual features
are extracted by using three different (bow, n-gram, sstf) models. Note that we
applied preprocessing on manifest contents to remove in-comprehensive information
(e.g., punctuation marks) in bow model. In addition, permission information are
also extracted to be used as features. In this phase, new feature sets are created by
combining these four feature sets with each other and this approach resulted in 10
different feature sets in total. Table 4 gives our four basic and six combined feature
sets and their codes used in our experiments.
Table 4
Investigated feature groups and codes in our experiments
Feature Set Code Feature Set Code
Structural and Statistical (SSTF) SS SS + BW SB
BOW BW NG + SS NS
Character level trigram NG PF + NG PN
Permissions PF BW + PF BP
BW + NG BN PF + SS PS
After the feature extraction, the term weighting process is applied so that binary
term weighting is used for permission based features, and ANTF weighting is applied
for textual features. Afterwards, the datasets are converted into classification-ready
structure. This task is also done by feature selection to explore its effect on results.
Table 5 presents the number of unique features before and after the feature selection.
Even though there are 135 permissions offered by the Android OS12, developers could
define new permissions depending upon the requirements of the application. In ad-
dition, the permissions which have the same features can be grouped under different
names. Therefore, the number of permission features is greater than 135 in our study.
12http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.html
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Table 5
The number of unique features for each dataset before and after feature selection
Dataset FS
Feature Set
PF BW NG SS BN SB NS PN BP PS
M0
- 195 4105 3480 20 7585 4125 3500 3675 4300 215
+ 11 28 67 7 61 28 61 59 28 15
S-AT
- 493 35898 12184 20 48082 35918 12204 12677 36391 513
+ 17 54 99 8 71 50 89 54 40 16
DRBN-AT
- 563 38875 12854 20 51729 38895 12874 13417 39438 583
+ 15 51 70 4 67 51 63 54 55 15
As the final step, classification task is performed with the help of different clas-
sifiers to observe the effect of selected classifier on the performance of our system.
Obtained results for the M0, S-AT, and DRBN-AT datasets are presented in Table 6,
Table 7, and Table 8 respectively. The best result for each feature set is denoted
in boldface, whereas underlined results represent the best results for the datasets.
According to our results, the highest malware detection accuracy rates for the M0,
S-AT, and DRBN-AT datasets are obtained as 94.0%, 99.3% and 98.2%, respectively.
In Table 9, we also present weighted average values of evaluation measures for the
best results on the datasets. The most successful feature model for each of the three
datasets is bow model. The feature groups including the bow features (i.e., SB, BP
and BN) are more successful than combined feature sets and the SVM generally out-
performs other classifiers. It is observed that the feature selection process generally
decreases classification success, even though it increases the success in some cases (see
Table 6) especially for NB and MNB classifiers.
Our system has the highest success rate of 99.3% on S-AT dataset and this value
varies depending on the classifier and feature set. The success rate of the sstf model
reaches up to 92.2% (see Table 7) which is promising and quite important in terms
of performance, especially when we consider its low feature space.
Table 6
Classification accuracies for the M0 dataset (%).
Classifier FS
Feature Set
PF BW NG SS BN SB NS PN BP PS
SVM
+ 78.4 91.2 88.7 75.6 93.4 92.1 88.7 91.8 91.2 88.4
- 90.0 92.5 88.4 85.3 92.5 92.5 88.7 90.3 93.4 92.8
ME
+ 79.0 90.0 85.9 80.0 90.6 89.6 85.6 88.1 90.0 87.1
- 91.5 85.3 84.0 82.5 84.6 85.9 83.4 85.3 85.9 89.0
C4.5
+ 80.9 89.3 85.9 80.6 90.9 89.3 87.5 89.0 89.3 88.4
- 88.4 87.8 83.1 83.4 86.8 87.8 80.3 85.0 88.7 87.1
NB
+ 80.6 91.2 90.6 75.9 94.0 91.5 88.7 90.0 90.9 86.2
- 75.6 89.6 86.2 75.9 89.6 89.6 86.5 86.8 89.6 79.6
MNB
+ 78.7 91.5 90.0 60.0 94.0 91.5 90.3 92.8 92.8 74.3
- 79.6 87.8 85.6 60.0 91.5 85.3 85.6 88.7 89.6 79.6
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Table 7
Classification accuracies for the S-AT dataset (%).
Classifier FS
Feature Set
PF BW NG SS BN SB NS PN BP PS
SVM
+ 88.2 96.3 92.3 83.3 97.5 96.5 94.7 92.8 95.7 90.7
- 96.2 99.1 95.8 86.6 99.3 99.2 96.3 97.7 99.3 96.7
ME
+ 88.3 96.3 92.6 86.9 96.7 96.2 92.9 92.2 93.5 90.8
- 93.4 97.4 94.2 88.5 97.1 97.6 94.7 94.8 97.7 94.2
C4.5
+ 87.8 97.1 93.3 91.9 97.7 97.0 93.6 92.6 96.6 91.2
- 96.8 97.6 94.0 92.2 97.7 96.6 93.1 95.5 97.4 96.6
NB
+ 87.8 93.6 87.6 78.7 93.9 93.9 86.5 80.6 91.9 90.0
- 91.3 94.7 86.5 79.6 92.5 94.9 86.7 86.7 94.9 89.3
MNB
+ 53.7 95.0 87.9 52.9 94.8 94.9 87.3 91.0 86.1 88.1
- 91.9 97.9 89.8 52.9 95.6 98.0 89.8 91.6 97.4 92.0
Table 8
Classification accuracies for the DRBN-AT dataset (%)
Classifier FS
Feature Set
PF BW NG SS BN SB NS PN BP PS
SVM
+ 92.3 91.7 85.4 79.2 92.4 91.7 89.0 93.0 93.8 92.3
- 93.6 98.0 93.6 80.5 97.7 97.9 94.2 97.1 98.2 94.0
ME
+ 92.4 91.9 88.1 82.0 92.7 91.9 89.2 93.5 93.5 92.1
- 88.3 93.4 91.2 83.3 93.5 93.8 91.6 92.6 93.8 89.8
C4.5
+ 92.1 93.5 88.6 86.6 93.6 93.5 90.4 93.7 95.4 92.4
- 94.9 93.1 91.1 87.2 91.7 93.5 90.0 94.6 94.8 95.0
NB
+ 91.8 86.4 76.5 76.4 88.8 86.4 76.9 72.3 88.1 91.5
- 86.3 88.0 80.8 74.0 88.0 88.1 81.1 81.2 88.3 83.2
MNB
+ 91.1 90.3 83.5 54.1 90.6 90.3 81.7 90.6 92.6 92.0
- 88.0 94.3 84.5 54.1 90.9 94.3 84.5 88.3 94.2 85.8
Table 9
Evaluation metrics for the best results on evaluated datasets
Dataset Classifier Feature Set
Evaluation Metric
Precision Recall F-Measure Acc (%)
S-AT
SVM BN 0.99 0.99 0.99 99.3
SVM BP 0.99 0.99 0.99 99.3
DRBN-AT SVM BP 0.98 0.97 0.97 98.2
M0 MNB, NB BN 0.93 0.91 0.91 94.0
To prove robustness and efficiency of our text mining based system, we also
performed detailed feature analysis to investigate the distribution of feature sets in
benign and malicious applications. We select the S-AT dataset for this analysis, as
the best accuracies are obtained on this dataset. For our feature analysis, we selected
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the most observed 45 features (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) from bow and permission
feature sets, respectively.
Figure 2. The most frequently observed bow features for the S-AT dataset.
Figure 3. The most frequently observed permission features for the S-AT dataset.
As seen from the Figure 2, we found out that activity, intent, permission, and
filter are defined more frequently in malware applications. It is also clear that there
is a huge difference in frequently used features among benign and malware manifest
contents. Figure 3 shows that malware applications mainly use some permissions
(e.g., INTERNET, READ PHONE STATE) more frequently. We also observed that bow
features mostly consist of tokenized permission names (e.g., READ PHONE STATE →
“read’, “phone”, “state”). This proves that there is a relevance between bow and
permission-based features. In addition, we investigated the total weights of the sstf
features between malware and benign applications. In particular, we detected that
NOW and CPWV are the most discriminative features (see Figure 4) in sstf model.
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All of the sstf features in malicious applications have also higher total weight when
compared to benign applications.
Figure 4. The weighted total frequencies of sstf features for the S-AT dataset.
5. Limitations and Future Work
Our system classifies an Android application as malware or benign by only analyzing
its manifest content. However, it does not analyze other files that may contain mali-
cious code. In some scenarios, it may not prevent an application by only processing
its manifest content. But this application may still be a malware as it can download
malicious code at runtime. The reason for this is that the designed system utilizes
static analysis approach and lacks dynamic inspection. These issues can be mitigated
by combining our system with a complete AMD system that uses hybrid approach.
Table 10 supports this idea that our system could be an alternative, when compared
to the some of other studies which use static approach.
Table 10
Comparison of the developed system with some of related works that use static approach.
Research Work Features
# of APK
Acc(%)
malware benign
MAMA [46] Permissions, uses-feature tags 333 333 94.8
DREBIN [4] Manifest, disassembled code features 5560 123453 93.9
PMDS [12] Permissions 1450 1500 95.4
DroidMat [42] Permissions, API calls, intent messages 238 1500 97.8
DroidAPIMiner [56] API calls 3987 16000 99.0
Ours Bow, n-grams, sstf, permissions 4421 3933 99.3
As there is need to collect and process big data in AMD, it is still not practical
to employ most of the existing methods at mobile devices. The reason for this is that
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the mobile device has limitations on computing resources, processing capability, and
memory storage. Therefore, we designed our system as a server-side system. But,
we are planning to develop a mobile prototype software which will make it possible
for the users to perform Android application analysis by sending the application file
to our malware analyzer remote server. We plan to enable the developed system to
analyze other source files by using text mining techniques and we will also try to
evaluate our improved system on large-scale datasets.
6. Conclusion
In general, malicious application programs are generally given permissions by most
Android based mobile device users in permission-based security model of Android,
even though the users are warned in risky cases. Therefore, detecting the malwares
is crucial before they are installed on the device. For this purpose, in this paper, we
designed a system to detect Android malwares by using the static analysis approach
based on text mining. Differently from existing works, our system constructs a fea-
ture vector for the software to be analyzed, and uses this feature vector to classify
the software as Android malware or not by applying text classification methods. The
features used in the classification process are mined only from the textual manifest
content of the suspicious application. Different feature sets extracted from the man-
ifest content are combined, then feature selection is applied to determine the most
important features to be used. Also, several classification algorithms are employed to
find out the most performant ones in terms of accuracy. Based on our experiments,
we observed that combined feature sets containing bow features improve accuracy,
especially when SVM is selected as classifier. Sstf features achieve promising results
especially when utilized with C4.5 classifier, even though they generally provide less
accuracy. Therefore, we suggest to use the sstf features to analyze not only manifest
content but also other source files.
Textual features are generally more successful than permission-based features.
On the other hand, manifest files of malware applications have richer content when
compared to the benign applications. Our analysis over the S-AT dataset discovered
that malware and benign applications have average number of 13 and 6 permissions,
respectively. It shows that if a manifest content of an application contains a large per-
mission list it is most likely a malware. Even majority of permissions are innocuous,
they may be included into manifest file to lead users to overlook other permissions
which can be used in malwares for different purposes. What is more, our experiments
prove that bow and n-gram features provide effective identification and detection of
malicious applications. Feature selection process decreases the accuracy in general.
We think that main reason for this is that bow and n-gram models produce sparse
representation of data. Therefore, in some cases, features selected by the CFS algo-
rithm may not highly correlated with classes, especially on large and sparse datasets.
Additionally, selected features may not be observed in test samples. The classifier
employed with the CFS method also affects the accuracy of malware detection. Con-
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sequently, we conclude that our work provides a promising basis for future studies in
context of malware detection by using text mining techniques. This also demonstrates
that developed system is capable of being used as part of a complete static, dynamic
or hybrid AMD system.
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